COMMENTS

The Uniformity Clause
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States ....

1

Congress's power to tax, granted in the first part of this sentence, is limited by the second part, which is known as the "uniformity clause." Though the power of taxation is among the most
awesome that government possesses,2 the nature and extent of the
limitation placed on that power by the uniformity clause has only
infrequently been considered by the Supreme Court; in no case has
the clause been relied upon to invalidate a statute. The most recent decision, United States v. Ptasynskis which leaves the uniformity clause virtually an empty shell, invites a more thorough
consideration of the clause than it has yet been given.
A review of the Supreme Court's treatment of the uniformity
clause will show that the Court has tried, without success, to devise
a workable rule with which to enforce it. The Court's early uniformity clause decisions4 developed a test according to which a tax
satisfies the clause if it operates in a geographically uniform manner. This test correctly reflects the purpose of the uniformity
1

'

art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Cf. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) ("[T]he power to tax

U.S. CONST.

involves the power to destroy ....

").

3 103 S. Ct. 2239 (1983).
4 The two most important cases are Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (discussed
infra notes 6-12 and accompanying text), and Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (discussed infra notes 13-28 and accompanying text). Other cases that discuss the uniformity
clause include Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 156-61 (1974); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 359-61 (1945); Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 102 (1942);
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 602 (1931); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117-18
(1930); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 138 (1929); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17
(1927); LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1921); Billings v. United
States, 232 U.S. 261, 282 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 158-59 (1911);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1901); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 520-23 (1899);
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173, 175, 181 (1796).
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clause: to restrain Congress in the imposition of geographically discriminatory taxes. Unfortunately, the test is also inadequate, since
all taxes, no matter how they are framed, have some geographically
nonuniform effects. The Court's early decisions provided no clear
criterion for distinguishing permissible from impermissible nonuniformity.
In Ptasynski, the Court attempted to establish such a criterion. The opinion in this case, however, suggests that only the most
patently discriminatory taxes will even be examined for violations
of the uniformity clause; furthermore, such examinations are apparently to be conducted in a manner that is extremely deferential
toward Congress. Ptasynski teaches Congress how good draftsmanship can protect its tax laws against uniformity clause challenges;
but in doing so, it deprives the clause of any force as a check on
congressional power.
After criticizing the Court's uniformity clause jurisprudence,
this comment argues that the uniformity clause should be read in
light of the Constitution's general preference for free markets and
unrestrained economic competition. While acknowledging that the
framers of the clause were probably concerned primarily with
preventing deliberate discrimination by majority factions in Congress, the comment argues that these concerns are best addressed
by a more objective constitutional test. Borrowing from the Court's
jurisprudence of the privileges and immunities clause and of the
"dormant commerce power," the comment proposes and explains a
new test for enforcing the uniformity clause. Though Ptasynski
may have been wrongly decided, the decision is not a major obstacle to the Court's adopting, at the next opportunity, the approach
developed here.

I.
A.

THE CASE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORMITY CLAUSE

The Early Cases

The Constitution requires that indirect taxes-duties, imposts,
and excises-be "uniform." 5 Because the goods and activities that
'Following the Supreme Court's usage, this comment refers to duties, imposts, and
excises as "taxes," even though the Constitution appears to distinguish "taxes" on the one
hand from "duties, imposts and excises" on the other. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1
(Congress may lay and collect "Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises," but "Duties, Imposts
and Excises" must be uniform) with United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S.Ct. 2239, 2243 (1983)
(speaking of duties, imposts, and excises as "indirect taxes"), and Knowlton v. Moore, 178
U.S. 41, 88 (1900) (discussing "the classes of taxes termed duties, imposts and excises").
The comment also follows the Court's convenient usage in calling duties, imposts, and
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can be taxed are distributed unequally through the country, virtually all such taxes have nonuniform effects. A tax on tobacco, for
example, will affect the tobacco-growing regions more severely
than others. Since the Constitution expressly empowers Congress
to levy indirect taxes, it must also permit some of the nonuniform
effects that inevitably accompany them. The principal challenge in
interpreting the uniformity clause, therefore, is to distinguish
whatever nonuniformity is forbidden by the Constitution from
such permissible nonuniform effects.
The Court's earliest exposition of the uniformity clause occurs
in a brief dictum in the Head Money Cases.' There, the Court declared that a tax is uniform if it "operates with the same force and
effect in every place where the subject of it is found."' This seminal formula, which may be called the "Head Money rule," has
been frequently cited and never criticized by the Court.8 The Head

excises "indirect" taxes. See, e.g., Ptasynski, 103 S.Ct. at 2243. This class of taxes is very
broad and perhaps not susceptible of perfectly clear definition:
Excises usually look to a particular subject, and levy burdens with reference to the act
of manufacturing them, selling them, etc. They are or may be as varied in form as are
the acts or dealings with which the taxes are concerned. Impost duties take every conceivable form, as may by the legislative authority be deemed best for the general
welfare.
Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 88. Apparently, the Court has assumed that the uniformity clause
applies to all taxes that are not "direct" within the meaning of the apportionment clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. See Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 83; Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515
(1899).
Although the constitutional meaning of "direct" taxation is notoriously elusive, see Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796); Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. CH. L. REv.819, 853-60 (1981) (discussing Hylton), the Court has
generally assumed that once a tax is found to be outside the reach of the apportionment
clause, it is within the reach of the uniformity clause. See, e.g., Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 83;
Nicol, 173 U.S. at 515-20. But see Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) at 173 (Chase, J.), 175 (Paterson,
J.), 181 (Iredell, J.); Head Money, 112 U.S. at 595-96; infra note 6.
' Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). A federal statute had laid a small charge on
the carrier of each alien coming by sea from a foreign port to any American port. The purpose of the charge was to raise funds for administering the immigration laws and for aiding
immigrants who found themselves in distress after their arrival. Id. at 589-90. One challenge
to the statute was based on the fact that the charge did not apply to aliens who entered over
the inland borders. The uniformity clause had been violated, it was argued, because the tax
applied only in those areas of the country where seaports were located. Id. at 583-84 (summarizing the argument for the plaintiff).
The Court ruled that the immigration charge was not a "tax" in the constitutional sense
of that term, but rather a "mere incident of the regulation of commerce," to which the
uniformity clause did not apply. Id. at 595-96. Recognizing, however, that the charge was
very much like a tax, the Court provided a brief analysis indicating that the statute would
have been upheld if the uniformity clause had been applicable. Id. at 594-95.
7 Id. at 594.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S.Ct. 2239, 2244 (1983); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 160-61 (1974); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 86
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Money rule reflects the Court's assumptions that "perfect" uniformity is unattainable9 and that the Constitution must mean to
forbid only geographically nonuniform taxation.1 0 Further, the
Court assumed that neither the Constitution nor the Head Money
rule prohibits geographically nonuniform effects, which are the inevitable concomitants of indirect taxes." The Head Money rule is
based on a common sense reading of the uniformity clause: the
framers must have intended the uniformity requirement to be attainable, but they must also have thought that it imposed some
definable restriction on Congress.
The Head Money rule, however, does not by itself place any
important limitation on congressional power. Its weakness lies in
its silence about the bounds, if any, on Congress's discretion to define the "subjects" of taxation. Suppose, for example, that Congress chose to define the "subject" of an excise tax as "all tobacco
grown in Maryland." With this definition, the Head Money rule
would be formally satisfied, but the most flagrant geographic discrimination would be possible. Now suppose that some kind of natural blight arose, which reduced the yields in most American
tobacco fields, but which had not spread to Maryland. Could Congress then define the subject of an excise as "all tobacco grown in
Maryland," without rendering the uniformity clause meaningless?
Would it make a difference if the definition were "all tobacco not
harvested from fields affected by the blight"? The Head Money
(1900).
( "Perfect uniformity and perfect equality
of taxation, in all the aspects in which the
human mind can view it, is a baseless dream. . . ... Head Money, 112 U.S. at 595 (citation
omitted). The Court did not explain what "perfect" uniformity would be, nor why it cannot
exist. In Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 106 (1900), the Court held that only geographic

uniformity is required. See infra notes 13-24 and accompanying text. After Knowlton it
would be unprofitable to inquire about the precise nature of other kinds of uniformity that
are not required by the Constitution.
10 The Court assumed, without explanation, that the Constitution requires only geographic uniformity: "The uniformity here prescribed has reference to the various localities
in which the tax is intended to operate." Head Money, 112 U.S. at 594. In Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900), the Court explained and defended this assumption. See infra
notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
21 The Court based this assumption on traditional practice: "Is the tax on tobacco void,
because in many of the States no tobacco is raised or manufactured? Is the tax on distilled
spirits void, because a few states pay three-fourths of the revenue arising from it?" Head
Money, 112 U.S. at 594.
Justice Miller, the author of the opinion, apparently thought that this was crucial.
Some years later, he summarized the case by stating the Head Money rule accompanied by
the following remark "There is no want of uniformity simply because the thing taxed is not
equally distributed in all parts of the United States." SAMUEL F. M=LLR, LECTURES ON THE
CONSTITUION OF THE UNIrrED STATEs 264 (1891).
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rule leaves these questions unanswered. 12
In Knowlton v. Moore,13 the Court's most thorough treatment
of the framers' intent in drafting the uniformity clause, a more
elaborate and well-supported version of the Head Money analysis
was presented. The case dealt with a revenue act that included an
inheritance tax exempting small legacies and taxing larger ones at
progressive rates. 14 It was claimed that the inheritance tax violated
the uniformity clause because it did not operate in precisely the
same manner on all individuals or all property.1 5 The Court held
that this kind of "intrinsic uniformity" is not required by the Constitution; rather, it demands only geographic uniformity in the
sense suggested by the Head Money rule."' Against the "intrinsic
uniformity" interpretation, the Court offered three separate arguments.
First, the language of the uniformity clause itself suggests a
geographic meaning. If "uniformity" required that taxes affect all
persons or all property identically, nothing would be added by
specifying that this uniformity must extend "throughout the
United States." But the quoted phrase does have meaning if it is
taken to qualify the term "uniform" by giving it a geographic
sense. Thus, the narrower reading is more natural and accords with
"' The Head Money Court appears to have recognized the inadequacy of the Head
Money rule. After stating the rule, it recapitulated its earlier discussion of Congress's purposes in enacting the challenged immigration charge, see supra note 6, and concluded:
"Here there is substantial uniformity within the meaning and purpose of the Constitution."
Head Money, 112 U.S. at 595. The opinion, however, contains no discussion of the constitutional "purpose"; nor did the Court explain how to distinguish substantial from insubstantial uniformity.
Is 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
14

See id. at 83-84.

'0 The Court termed this demand for identical treatment the "intrinsic uniformity"
requirement. Id. at 84-85. The opinion does not make clear whether the requirement would
demand that individuals or property or both be treated identically. Nor does it explain how
such a requirement could be met. In any case, however, it is clear that "intrinsic uniformity"
would be a far more stringent requirement than geographic uniformity. See id. Since
Knowlton demonstrates that only geographic uniformity is required by the Constitution, it
is no longer important to know exactly what "intrinsic uniformity" would be.
11 A tax is uniform if it "operates with the same force and effect in every place where
the subject of it is found." Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 86 (quoting Head Money, 112 U.S. at 594).
Knowlton also uses this equivalent formulation: "wherever a subject is taxed anywhere, the
same must be taxed everywhere throughout the United States, and at the same rate." Id. at
84.
The Knowlton holding, unlike the holding in Head Money, depends on the Court's construction of the uniformity clause. Knowlton is therefore more authoritative, in addition to
being more carefully argued. While this provides support for the Head Money rule, it should
be noted that Knowlton holds only that a progressive rate structure does not cause a tax to
violate the uniformity clause.

1198

The University of Chicago Law Review

[51:1193

the canon of construction17 that requires giving an effect to each
word of the Constitution.
Second, the Court pointed out that the constitutional scheme
of taxation would make little sense unless the uniformity clause
had a geographic meaning. Indirect taxes are least likely to affect
all persons equally since few, if any, taxable goods and services are
produced or consumed equally by everyone. To abolish a whole
class of quite traditional taxes by an indirect and ambiguous uniformity requirement would be a perversity that should not needlessly be attributed to the Constitution. I8 Furthermore, direct
taxes (such as the capitation tax) are not subject to the uniformity
requirement, though they are the very ones with respect to which
some kind of "intrinsic" uniformity would often be practicable. Direct taxes are instead subject to the apportionment requirement,19
whose purpose is manifestly to prevent certain kinds of discrimination among the states and regions.20 Giving the uniformity clause a
geographic significance is consonant with the same general purpose
and thus harmonizes two related constitutional provisions.2 1
Third, the Court showed that the historical record strongly
supports a geographic interpretation of the uniformity clause. An
extensive review of the use of indirect taxes in England, in the
American colonies and states, and in the early Congresses provided
no evidence that a rule of intrinsic uniformity had ever been
adopted.2 2 A thorough examination of the records of the Continental Congress and the Federal Convention indicated that the purpose of the clause is to prevent Congress from favoring one state or
region over another; 28 taxes with incidental nonuniform effects
Id. at 87.
is Id. at 87-89.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless
in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken."), modified,
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
20 See Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 89 ("Now, that the requirement that direct taxes should
be apportioned among the several States, contemplated the protection of the States, to prevent their being called upon to contribute more than was deemed their due share of the
17

burden, is clear."). See also DAVED HUTCHSON, THs FoUNDATONS OF THE CONSTrrunoN 142

(1975) (purpose of the apportionment clause was to prevent property, including slaves, from
being taxed at arbitrary rates, i.e., rates not corresponding to productive value).
21Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 89.
2 Id. at 89-95.
23 Id. at 95-106. The Court's conclusion is summarized in these passages:
[The sole and the only question which was ever present and in every form was discussed, was the operation of any taxing power which might be granted to Congress
upon the respective States; in other words, the discrimination as regards States which
might arise from a greater or lesser proportion of any tax being paid within the geo-
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were not meant to be proscribed.24
By firmly establishing that the uniformity clause does not require "intrinsic" uniformity, Knowlton is able to avoid an interpretation that would virtually eliminate the federal government's
power to use indirect taxes.25 At the same time, Knowlton, like
Head Money, insists that geographic uniformity is required and
that the clause thereby puts some limitation on Congress's power
to impose indirect taxes. The constitutional provision is thus saved
from being either absurdly strict or completely empty.
Like "intrinsic" uniformity, however, geographic uniformity
could be interpreted so strictly that few, if any, indirect taxes
could meet the constitutional test.2 By refusing to accept the ar-

gument that every tax with geographically nonuniform effects is
constitutionally infirm, Head Money and Knowlton preserve the
uniformity clause from another interpretation that would render it
absurd or perverse.27
The principal positive contribution of the two cases is to show
that the general purpose of the uniformity clause .is to prevent
Congress from employing discriminatory taxes in the service of regional favoritism. Head Money seems to assume such a purpose
tacitly, and Knowlton shows that this was indeed how the clause
must have been understood by those who framed and ratified the
graphical limits of a particular State.
Id. at 96 (discussing the debates in the Continental Congress).
Considering the . . . [constitutional] convention, the same observation is pertinent
which we have previously made as to the Continental Congress ....
[N]ot a single
word is found in any of the debates ... which give the slightest intimation that any
suggestion was ever made that the grant of power to tax was considered from the point
of view of its operation upon the individual.
Id. at 101.
24 The Court supported this conclusion as follows:
The sense in which the word "uniform" was used is shown by the fact that the committee [on style], whilst adopting in a large measure the proposition of Mr. McHenry and
General Pinckney, "that all duties, imposts, excises, prohibitions or restraints ... shall
be uniform and equal throughout the United States," struck out the words "and
equal." Undoubtedly this was done to prevent the implication that taxes should have
an equal effect in each State. As we have seen, the pith of the controversy during the
Confederation was that even, although the same duty or the same impost or the same
excise was laid all over the United States, it might operate unequally by reason of the
unequal distribution or existence of the article taxed among the respective States.
Id. at 104 (referring to the Federal Convention). The Court's examination of the records of
the Continental Congress and of the Federal Convention led it to substantially identical
conclusions. See id. at 95-106.
" See supra text following note 5; supra note 18 and accompanying text.
1" Cf. supra text following note 5.
17 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Constitution.2 8 But because the Court never distinguished permissible from impermissible "subjects" of taxation, the Head Money
rule, standing alone, could be converted into an empty formality.
Both Head Money and Knowlton supplement the Head Money
rule with discussions of the purpose of the clause, thus suggesting-without declaring-that the class of permissible "subjects" would have to be defined in light of that purpose. Neither
opinion, however, formulates such a definition.
The Supreme Court Reconsiders the Uniformity Clause

B.

1. United States v. Ptasynski. Recently, the Court was
presented with an opportunity to solve the principal problem left
open by Head Money and Knowlton. United States v. Ptasynski2 9
is the first case that directly addresses the limits on Congress's discretion to choose the "subjects" of taxation. In an important dictum, the Court declared that any tax in which the "subject" is defined in nongeographic terms satisfies the uniformity clause."
Ptasynski holds that where the "subject" is defined in geographic
terms, the tax will be scrutinized for "actual geographic discrimination"; 1 apparently, however, this scrutiny will be accompanied
32
by considerable deference toward Congress's judgment.
The Ptasynski case arose after Congress enacted the Crude
Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, 83 which imposed an excise on
the production of domestic crude oil. Employing a number of criteria, the law divided oil into numerous categories, which were
28

See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.

9 103 S. Ct. 2239 (1983).
30

Id. at 2245 (citing Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 106). This dictum is a crucial element of the

Court's understanding of the meaning of the uniformity clause. For that reason, although it

is not strictly necessary to the holding in the case, it contributes significantly to the analysis
that appears to lead the Court to its holding; the dictum is therefore obiter only in a somewhat attenuated sense. This part of the Court's opinion is criticized infra notes 60-64 and
accompanying text.

31 Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at 2245.
32 See id. at 2246; infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. This part of the Court's
opinion is criticized infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
- Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
scattered other sections of 26 U.S.C. (1982)).

§§ 4986-4998

and

" The Act purports to be taxing "windfall profits," but this is somewhat inaccurate and
misleading. While the Act is undoubtedly aimed generally at reducing oil producers' profits,
"windfall profits" are defined in the Act without reference to either windfalls or profits:
though the tax on any given barrel of oil is limited to 90% of the "net income" attributable
to that barrel, the tax can be imposed even when a taxpayer has had a loss on his operation.
See 26 U.S.C. § 4988 (1982). At the crucial point in the Act, the tax is accurately characterized as an "excise." Id. § 4986(a).

The Uniformity Clause

1984]

1201

then taxed at various rates or exempted from the tax altogether.35
Among the exemptions was one for oil from most areas north of
the Arctic Circle," where production was said to be especially difficult and expensive.87 This provision for "exempt Alaskan oil ' 38
stimulated a constitutional challenge by affected taxpayers3 9 and
by the states of Texas and Louisiana. 40 The United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming, relying largely on Head Money
and Knowlton, found that the Alaskan exemption violated the uniformity clause: "The Constitution has unequivocally set forth a
limitation on indirect taxation-uniformity-which has been narrowly, but precisely defined by the judiciary. Distinctions based on
geography are simply not allowed. 4 1 In a unanimous decision, announced in a brief opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, thus up42
holding the tax.

The Ptasynski Court began its analysis by examining the intent of the framers. Noting that direct evidence from the Federal
Convention is very scanty, the Court nonetheless observed that a
general concern with regional discrimination clearly underlay the
adoption of the uniformity clause.4s The Court offered an extrajudicial statement by Justice Story as a fair summary of the purpose
of the constitutional provision. That statement emphasizes the extreme oppression that could result if a self-serving combination of
states were to get control of the federal taxing power."
"

Id. §§ 4988-4994. For a brief summary of the rather complicated scheme of categories

and exemptions, see Licata, Windfall Profit Tax Declared Unconstitutional,31 Om & GAs
TAx Q. 637, 637-39 (1983).
30 26 U.S.C. §§ 4991(b), 4994(e) (1982).
37 See United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. 2239, 2242 (1983) (discussing the legislative history of the exemption for oil produced in most areas north of the Arctic Circle).
- 26 U.S.C. f§ 4991(b), 4994(e) (1982).
39 The plaintiffs and intervenors included individual taxpayers (oil producers and royalty owners) and several industry associations. Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549,
550 (D.Wyo. 1982).
40

Id.

41Id. at 553. A challenge under the fifth amendments takings clause was rejected by

the district court. Id. at 555. The Supreme Court's Ptasynski opinion gives no indication
that that rejection should be reconsidered. For an analysis supporting the fifth-amendment
challenge, see Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation,20 OsGoons HAL. L.J. 433,
433-41, 443-45 (1982).
,' United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S.Ct. 2239 (1983).
43Id. at 2243 & n.10. This passage concisely summarizes the very detailed discussion in
Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 101-06 (discussed supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text).
4 103 S. Ct. at 2243-44 (quoting 1 J. STORY, COMMMARIES ON THE CONSTrrUrON OF
SUNrrm STATES § 957 (T. Cooley ed. 1873) (1st ed. Boston 1833)). The passage quoted
from Story is this:
[The purpose of the clause] was to cut off all undue preferences of one State over
another in the regulation of subjects affecting their common interests. Unless duties,
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The Court then observed that this general statement of purpose does not sufficiently define the scope of the uniformity clause.
After discussing the Head Money rule,45 the Court declared that
imposts, and excises were uniform, the grossest and most oppressive inequalities, vitally affecting the pursuits and employments of the people of different States, might
exist. The agriculture, commerce, or manufactures of one State might be built up on
the ruins of those of another; and a combination of a few States in Congress might
secure a monopoly of certain branches of trade and business to themselves, to the injury, if not to the destruction, of their less favored neighbors.
Story's central point is obscured by the Court's failure to quote the entire passage,
which continues:
The constitution, throughout all its provisions, is an instrument of checks and restraints, as well as of powers. It does not rely on confidence in the general government
to preserve the interests of all the States. It is founded in a wholesome and strenuous
jealousy, which, foreseeing the possibility of mischief, guards with solicitude against
any exercise of power which may endanger the States, as far as it is practicable. If this
provision as to uniformity of duties had been omitted, although the power might never
have been abused to the injury of the feebler States of the Union, (a presumption
which history does not justify us in deeming quite safe or certain,) yet it would, of
itself, have been sufficient to demolish, in a practical sense, the value of most of the
other restrictive clauses in the Constitution. New York and Pennsylvania might, by an
easy combination with the Southern States, have destroyed the whole navigation of
'New England. A combination of a different character, between the New England and
the Western States, might have borne down the agriculture of the South; and a combination of a yet different character might have struck at the vital interests of manufactures. So that the general propriety of this clause is established by its intrinsic political
wisdom, as well as by its tendency to quiet alarms and suppress discontents.
1 J. STORY, supra, § 957 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Story emphasized that the
uniformity clause is one of the devices by which the Constitution puts more restraint on the
federal government than may be absolutely necessary to protect the interests of the constituent states and regions. The Court's selective quotation conveys the impression that the
uniformity clause was meant to prevent only the most egregiously discriminatory taxation,
while Story's point is almost the opposite. The Court's reading of Story seems to have
colored its understanding of the uniformity clause itself: the term "undue preferences" from
the Story passage reappears-without the accompanying adjective "all--in the Court's
highly deferential evaluation of Congress's motives in enacting the Alaskan exemption to
the windfall profit tax. See Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at 2246. For further discussion of the
purpose of the uniformity clause, see infra notes 69-108 and accompanying text.
"' 103 S. Ct. at 2244. The Court failed to note that the drafters of the Windfall Profit
Tax Act were evidently aware of the Head Money rule, for they defined the "subject" of the
tax as "taxable crude oil." 26 U.S.C. § 4986(a) (1982). Since this definition of the "subject"
of the tax includes no geographic terms, the Head Money rule was not formally violated.
Obviously, were the Court to permit so blatant an ipse dixit, the uniformity clause would be
reduced to a meaningless formality. But though the Ptasynski Court referred to the Head
Money rule three times, see 103 S. Ct. at 2242, 2244, 2245, it never pointed out how easy it
is to ensure that any tax will formally satisfy the rule.
Although the Court either overlooked or ignored the attempt by the Act's draftsmen to
evade the Head Money rule, the Court apparently did assume that the "subject" of the tax
could properly be defined to exclude "exempt Alaskan oil." See Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at
2242 (referring to exempt oil as a "separate class of oil"). This makes it possible to reconcile
the Alaskan exemption with the Head Money rule, for if the "subject" of the tax were "oil,"
the Alaskan exemption would violate the Head Money rule. In the sanm.e paragraph, however, the Court seems to have forgotten its assumption and reverted to a more natural
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the clause does not restrict Congress's freedom to define the "subjects" of taxation, so long as the definition does not employ geographic terms.4" Thus, had the tax challenged in Ptasynski provided an exemption for all oil produced from wells that cost more
than $1,000,000 to drill, there would presumably not have been
even a colorable objection based on the uniformity clause, although
the effects of this definition might have been virtually identical to
those of the geographic definition that Congress in fact used.47
This conclusion apparently rested on the assumption that if geographic terms were avoided in defining the subjects of taxation, the
abuses that the uniformity clause was intended to prevent could
not be achieved.
Once the Court announced this sweeping new rule, only one
question remained: when may Congress permissibly define the
"subject" of a tax in overtly geographic terms? 4 In order to answer
this question, the Court turned to a recent decision under the
description of the tax "Congress chose to exempt oil produced in the defined region from
the windfall profit tax." Id. If this implies that Congress exempted a certain region from a
tax on oil, the Head Money rule was violated.
These rather difficult distinctions between geographic exemptions from a tax (which
violate the Head Money rule) and geographic exemptions from the "subject" of a tax (which
may or may not violate the Head Money rule) suggest the need for a test that reflects more
directly the purposes that the uniformity clause was meant to serve. Such a test is proposed
infra notes 109-32 and accompanying text.
" 103 S. Ct. at 2244. Here, and again later in the opinion, the Court cited Knowlton for
the proposition that any definition framed in nongeographic terms is permissible. See id. at
2244, 2245 (citing Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 106). This is simply wrong. The cited passage in
Knowlton merely states that the words of the uniformity clause "do not signify an intrinsic
but simply a geographical uniformity." The same passage quotes a comment from the ratification debates suggesting at most that some (unspecified) geographically nonuniform effects
are compatible with the clause. Id. Thus, Ptasynski's most sweeping and radical innovation
rests on a misstatement of a prior case. Fortunately, this innovation is not part of the holding in the case. See supra note 30.
47 Apparently, this definition would have had substantially the same effect as the geographic definition of "exempt Alaskan oil" used by Congress. See Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at
2242 n.7. An even more refined definition could undoubtedly be constructed by adding criteria phrased in terms of climate, availability of transport, and perhaps even proximity to
Eskimos. In any event, the Court assumed that the equivalent effect could have been
achieved by using some definition that lacked geographic terms. See Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at
2245 ("We cannot say that when Congress uses geographic terms to identify the same subject [that it could have defined in nongeographic terms], the classification is invalidated.").
This assumption suggests that the Court was deliberately adopting a rule designed to make
it easy for Congress to prevent uniformity clause challenges to its taxation measures. The
suggestion gains further support from the Court's highly deferential treatment of Congress's
motives in enacting the Alaskan exemption to the windfall profit tax. See infra notes 56-59,
64-67 and accompanying text.
4 103 S. Ct. at 2244.
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bankruptcy clause.4 This decision-RegionalRail Reorganization
Act Cases ("Rail Act Cases")5°-had indicated that the power of
Congress to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States ' 5' permitted the enactment of a
special bankruptcy law for the financially troubled railroads in one
region of the country.52 The Court in the Rail Act Cases had cited
Head Money for the proposition that where Congress is addressing
a geographically isolated problem, a law can be uniform even
though it treats different regions differently.5 3 The Court concluded, on the strength of the Rail Act Cases' reading of the bankruptcy clause, 54 that the uniformity clause permits Congress to ad49The Court acknowledged in a footnote that this question had already been answered
in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). In Downes, which was decided only a year after
Knowlton and by the same Justices, the Court expressly indicated that if the "subject" of a
duty were defined as "goods originating in Puerto Rico" and if Puerto Rico were a part of
the United States, the duty would violate the uniformity clause. See Downes, 182 U.S. at
249. Though this was dictum, so, too, were virtually all the passages from Head Money and
Knowlton on which Ptasynski relies. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; supra note
16. The Ptasynski Court did not explain why it chose to give so much weight to Head
Money and Knowlton and none at all to Downes.
50 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
s U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.4.
"See 419 U.S. at 156-61.
419 U.S. at 160-61. While emphasizing one particular fact in Head Money (that Congress was addressing a geographically isolated problem), the Rail Act Cases did not mention
that the comments in Head Money about the uniformity clause were dicta. Nor did the Rail
Act Cases mention the fact that under the peculiar facts of Head Money, no region was
given any special advantage or disadvantage. The money raised by the immigration charge
was to be spent to aid immigrants, and it could therefore be assumed that the revenue
raised and the expenditures made with that revenue would be roughly equivalent in any
given region. See supra note 6. On the significance of this fact, see infra notes 69-108 and
accompanying text (arguing that the purpose of the uniformity clause is to prevent the
granting of a competitive advantage to particular regions).
54 The Ptasynski Court did not explain in detail why it should rely on a bankruptcy
clause case to construe the uniformity clause. There appear, however, to be two possible
justifications for this reliance. First, the word "uniform" occurs in both clauses. The same
word, however, may have different meanings at different places in the Constitution. Cf.
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (arguing that
the word "necessary" has different meanings at different places in the Constitution). The
Court itself acknowledged that the purposes of the two clauses are not identical. Ptasynski,
103 S.Ct. at 2244 n.13. Since the Court did not explain what the different purposes are or
why they do not affect the meaning of the words used, one is left without a compelling
reason to suppose that the language has an identical meaning in both places.
A second justification for turning to the Rail Act Cases is (as the Court noted in
Ptasynski) that Head Money was cited in that opinion. Indeed, the Court went so far as to
state that the "substance" of the decision in the Rail Act Cases was that the uniformity
clause (rather than the uniformity provision of the bankruptcy clause, which is what was at
issue in the Rail Act Cases) does not prohibit Congress from "considering geographically
isolated problems." Ptasynski, 103 S.Ct. at 2245. This is both a misstatement of the Rail
Act Cases holding and a gross overstatement of the authority of the Rail Act Cases' citation,
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dress "geographically isolated problems" by framing taxes in
55
geographic terms.
In order to distinguish those cases where Congress is attempting to solve "geographically isolated problems" from those in
which it is violating the uniformity clause, the Court formulated a
new constitutional test: "where Congress does choose to frame a
tax in geographic terms, we will examine the classification closely
to see if there is actual geographic discrimination."5 6 The Court
then briefly discussed Congress's motives in enacting the Windfall
Profit Tax Act,5 7 alluded to Congress's finding that oil production
is more difficult and expensive in northern Alaska than elsewhere,58 and concluded that the challenged exemption was a reasonable attempt by Congress to address this geographically isoin dictum, of dicta from Head Money. It should be noted that the dissent in the Rail Act
Cases complained that Head Money had been misused by the majority. See Rail Act Cases,
419 U.S. at 184 n.22 (Douglas, J., dissenting). If the Rail Act Cases Court was wrong to
conflate the uniformity and bankruptcy clauses, there is no reason for any later Court to
repeat the error.
Even if one assumes that the word "uniform" has an identical meaning in the bankruptcy clause and in the uniformity clause, the Court may have construed the word incorrectly in the Rail Act Cases. See id. at 180-85 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Court's misconstruction of the term "uniform" in one clause of the Constitution would not justify
mechanically extending that misconstruction to other unrelated constitutional provisions.
And since the Court's interpretation of one clause is not strong precedent for its later consideration of the meaning of another clause, it would be entirely proper to approach the
interpretation of the uniformity clause without being unduly influenced by the prior treatment of the bankruptcy clause.
This comment explicates the meaning of the uniformity clause. See infra notes 69-108
and accompanying text. Bankruptcy clause decisions that interpret the word "uniform" differently are not relevant to that meaning unless it can be shown both that the word has the
same meaning in both clauses and that such bankruptcy decisions correctly construed the
word. Ptasynski does neither.
103 S. Ct. at 2245.
Id. (citing Rail Act Cases,419 U.S. at 160-61). The term "actual geographic discrimination" is not defined in Ptasynski. Curiously, the sentence announcing the "actual geographic discrimination" test is followed by a citation to the passage in the Rail Act Cases,
419 U.S. at 160-61, where Head Money is invoked. Neither the Rail Act Cases nor Head
Money uses the phrase in question.
57 103 S. Ct. at 2245-46.
58 Id. at 2246; cf. id. at 2242 n.7 (citing evidence that "the cost of developing oil in
Alaska far exceeds that in other parts of the country"). The Court seems to have assumed
that, because the harsh climate in northern Alaska makes drilling wells there more expensive than elsewhere, the cost of oil production must also be higher. This is a false inference,
because the cost per-barrel-produced is affected by factors other than drilling costs (e.g., the
number of wells that must be drilled in order to produce a given amount of oil). Furthermore, the Court was provided with specific examples of areas that have high production
costs for reasons other than those that apply in Alaska: offshore fields, heavy oil fields, deep
oil horizons, and fields requiring secondary and tertiary flooding. Brief of Amici Curiae, The
Legal Foundation of America, et al. at 8, United States v. Ptasynski. See also infra note
142.
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lated problem. 9
2. Defects in the Ptasynski Analysis. The Court's opinion in
Ptasynski reflects an overly narrow understanding of the purpose
of the uniformity clause; it also reflects an unwarranted decision to
defer to Congress's judgment in all but the most flagrant cases of
abuse of the taxing power.
These shortcomings first become visible in the Court's dictum
declaring a per se rule of validity for taxes framed in nongeographic terms.0 0 Under this rule, Congress may enact blatantly discriminatory indirect taxes without risking constitutional scrutiny:
it need only take care to frame the "subjects" of taxation in nongeographic terms. 1 This would permit Congress to violate the purpose of the uniformity clause as it was stated in the very quotation
from Justice Story relied upon so heavily by the Court.2 By authorizing all "preferences" that happen to be clothed in certain
language, Ptasynski guarantees that some "undue preferences"6 s
will be permissible. The Court's opinion is therefore inconsistent
with its own presentation of the purpose of the clause."
Moreover, Ptasynski'snew constitutional test for taxes framed
in geographic terms-"actual geographic discrimination"-is so
vague and so bereft of accompanying explanation that it must be
considered essentially empty. It could be read to suggest almost
any standard imaginable, from the most stringent to the most
lax.65 But the superficial remarks about congressional motives that
follow the announcement of this new test suggest nothing so much
as a Court substituting judicial deference to Congress for constitu59 Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at 2246 ("Where . . . Congress has exercised its considered
judgment with respect to an enormously complex problem, we are reluctant to disturb its
determination.").
6See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
:1 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 44.
63 This is Justice Story's term. See Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at 2243 (quoting Story); cf. id.
at 2246 (discussing the possibility of an "undue preference" in the Alaskan exemption to the
windfall profit tax); supra note 44.
"It is easy to imagine that the Court would use the uniformity clause to invalidate a
taxation scheme as grossly oppressive as the ones Story described. But to do so, the rule

announced in Ptasynski, see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text, would have to be
changed.
""Actual geographic discrimination" might be contrasted with "illusory geographic
discrimination," so that the constitutional test would focus on the actual effects of the tax.
This could lead to a very strict uniformity requirement. On the other hand, the formula
could be taken to suggest that the Court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
Congress has acted from a malevolent intent. This would erect a virtually insurmountable
barrier to uniformity clause challenges.
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tional analysis."' Thus, even in the rare case where the congressional drafters are not ingenious or painstaking enough to avoid
geographic terminology, the legislation will apparently be very
likely to survive a constitutional challenge.
The root of the Ptasynski Court's unsatisfactory doctrine appears to be an overly narrow understanding of the purpose of the
uniformity clause. By focusing on the spectacle of horrors evoked
by Justice Story, the Court is apparently led to assume that the
uniformity clause is only meant to prevent geographic discrimination so gross and oppressive that it would actually endanger the
Union. 67 While the Court does not articulate this assumption, its
analysis is hardly compatible with any other: the Court restricts
the application of the uniformity clause to an extraordinarily narrow class of cases and signals a strong reluctance to find the clause
violated even there.
The Court's narrow reading of the clause is not totally without
historical support. It is true that the confederation period was

" Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at 2245-46. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. Thu
kind of case-by-case analysis of congressional motives suggested in Ptasynski might incline
future Courts to behave like legislatures rather than like judges. By leaving the Justices
without any clear guidance about what sorts of taxes are permissible, the Ptasynski test
leaves them free to begin with their policy preferences and then to scrutinize a challenged
statute with greater or lesser intensity depending on their initial like or dislike of the tax.
This would leave the status of the uniformity clause unsettled, subjecting it to whimsical
and unpredictable metamorphoses. Even if a Justice wished to resist this temptation, he
would still be left without guidance and might "follow" Ptasynski by taking refuge in an
unthinking deference to Congress.
61See supra note 44 and accompanying text. It is possible that the Court was influenced by the fact that the passage of the Act was a hotly debated political issue, see, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, July 26, 1979, at 1, col. 6 (President Carter alleges existence of "a massive
struggle to gut the windfall profits tax bill"), and that the language of the challenged exemption could easily have been reworded to avoid geographic terminology, see supra note 47
and accompanying text. The principal briefs filed with the Court on behalf of the challengera of the Windfall Profit Tax Act lend some support to such speculations. None of those
briefs offered a satisfactory interpretation of the uniformity clause. And at least two of them
suggested that the same tax should be upheld if drafted a little differently. See Brief of
Taxpayer Appellees at 12-13 (suggesting a "cold weather" exemption); Brief for the State of
Texas, Appellee at 22-23 (urging that the plain-meaning rule of statutory construction be
strictly applied). But see Brief for the State of Louisiana, Appellee at 23-24 (more is required than "mere niceties of draftsmanship"); Brief of Association Appellees at 10-15 (asserting that legislative history shows that the Act was the result of some states seeking to
oppress others). Furthermore, it is possible that the challengers believed that the results of
the 1980 elections would preclude the windfall profit tax from being reenacted. It is easy to
imagine the Court thinking that under these circumstances it would be silly
to strike down a
major law merely because of a slight error in draftsmanship.
For an argument that there were more substantial reasons for invalidating the Windfall
Profit Tax Act, see infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
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marked by very troublesome regional conflicts"5 and that the framers probably were most apprehensive about exactly the sort of extreme factionalism that Story described. But to assume that the
scope of the clause is confined to such evils violates one of the oldest and most authoritative canons of constitutional construction:
where the framers were concerned primarily with preventing particular evils, but chose language embracing a broader class, they
are presumed to have meant what they said. e9 The full meaning of
what the framers of the uniformity clause said has not yet received
a satisfactory exposition; the next section of this comment is devoted to presenting that exposition.
II.

A

NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE UNIFORMITY CLAUSE

The uniformity clause is best understood as a check on the use
of the federal power to promote or inhibit the commercial development of one region of the country in relation to another. It is an
element of a consistent constitutional plan-implied in the text,
intended by the framers, and acknowledged by the Supreme
Court-to foster a national, free-market economy in which goods
and services from all regions of the country are allowed to compete
70
on an equal footing.
" See, e.g., J. MADISON, NoTEs OF DEBATEs iN 'r FEDERL CoNvwMrON OF 1787, at 14
(A. Koch ed. 1966); see also infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
a" Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 644-45 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J.). As Chief Justice Marshall recognized, the presumption that the Constitution employs
language within the ordinary range of its meaning can be rebutted by showing, for example,
that certain phrases were employed as terms of art. There is no evidence, however, that
"uniform" was used by the framers to mean "sufficiently uniform to avoid only the grossest
inequalities." The suggestion to this effect in the Story passage is the result only of the
Ptasynski Court's selective quotation. See supra note 44.
70 This comment uses the terms "free market" and "free-market economy" interchangeably with the eighteenth-century terms "free trade" and "free commerce." The
meaning of these terms can probably not be given a universally acceptable definition, but
each of them suggests an economic system in which private decisions predominate and competition is relatively uninhibited; government regulation serves mainly either to facilitate
free competition or to secure public goods that a market dominated by private decisionmakers cannot provide.
Although the terms "trade" and "commerce" are sometimes used in a narrower sense,
meaning only the physical movement of commodities, this comment will employ the broader
usage for three reasons. First, restriction of the terms to this narrow meaning seems not to
have developed until long after the framing of the Constitution. See Roper, The Constitution: Discovered or Discarded, 16 NoTRn DAmE LAw. 97, 105-21 (1941). Second, since the
free movement of goods is useful primarily because it fosters free competition, there would
be little sense in becoming exercised about obstacles to the movement of goods unless those
obstacles caused a reduction in free competition. Third, the Constitution and itshistory
support the following syllogism: the commerce clause must have been motivated either by
concerns confined to the physical movement of goods or by a broader concern with free
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In order to give effect to this purpose, the Head Money rule
should be supplemented with a new test that requires every indirect tax having geographically discriminatory effects to serve some
significant purpose other than promoting such discrimination. This
would discourage the evils that the clause was designed to prevent,
while leaving Congress ample discretion to exercise the powers
granted to it by the Constitution.
A.

The Purpose of the Uniformity Clause

Knowlton convincingly demonstrated that, as the Head
Money Court had assumed, the uniformity clause was not intended
to ban all indirect taxes having geographically nonuniform effects.7 1 Ptasynski correctly assumed that the clause should prohibit very invidious or oppressive regional discrimination but apparently also assumed that this is the limit of its purpose. Since
the Ptasynski analysis eviscerates the uniformity clause and since
all constitutional provisions should be presumed to be significant,7 2
Ptasynski invites a reconsideration of the purpose of the clause.
1. The Economic and PoliticalPresuppositionsof the Constitution: The Commerce Clause and Its Limitations. Among the
most pressing reasons for calling the Federal Convention was widespread dissatisfaction with the obstacles to commerce that existed
under the Articles of Confederation." Among the more obvious of
competition in the economy;, the uniformity clause was originally linked with a clause limiting the exercise of the commerce power, see infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text; the
uniformity clause as finally adopted has no direct effect on the physical movement of commodities; therefore, unless the uniformity clause underwent an alteration of its general purpose, for which there is no historical evidence, the framers of the Constitution must have
been concerned with "commerce" in its broader sense.
71 See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
7' Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and
therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.").
" See THE FEDxRAsT No. 22, at 143-45 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasizing the consensus on the need to provide the federal government with the power to regulate commerce); J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF =raFEDMERAL CONVSnON 46-48 (E. Scott ed. 1898)
(treating the conflicting commercial regulations of the states as one of the chief evils for
which the Federal Convention was to provide a remedy); see also Passenger Cases, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 283, 445 (1849) (opinion of Catron, J.) ("Before the Constitution existed, the
States taxed the commerce and intercourse of each other. This was the leading cause of
abandoning the Confederation and forming the Constitution,-more than all other causes it
led to the result. . . ."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 224 (1824) (opinion of
Johnson, J.) (noting that the states' powers over their own commerce led to a "conflict of
commercial regulations," which was "the immediate cause that led to the forming of a convention."); Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. Cm. L. Rzv.
556, 559-60 (1936) (arguing that the inability of Congress to regulate commerce led to evils
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these obstacles was the hodgepodge of duties and restrictions imposed by the states on goods going over their borders.7 4 These barriers to trade served to choke economic growth, raise prices, and
thus leave all the states worse off than they would have been had
they adopted the principle of free trade.7 5 Nevertheless, no state
whose remedy was the chief goal of the Constitutional Convention); Stern, That Commerce
Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HAv. L. REv. 1335, 1337 (1934) ("The Constitutional Convention was called because the Articles of Confederation had not given the Federal Government any power to regulate commerce.").
The events leading up to the Constitutional Convention began with a conference on
trade, held in Annapolis a few months before the Federal Convention in Philadelphia.
Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 100-01. That conference had been suggested by a small group of men,
led by George Washington, who were disturbed by the absence of uniformity in commercial
regulations. 1 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNrTE STATES OF AmICA 249-50 (1882 & photo, reprint 1983). The trade conference was
unable to act because several states were unrepresented. JAMES Q. WILSON, AsmvucAN GovRNmENT 21 (2d ed. 1983); 1 G. BANCROFT,supra, at 267-70.
This comment does not take the position that commercial concerns provided the sole or
even the most important reason for framing a new constitution. For a sharp critique of that
position, see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 265-75 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting).
74 D. HUTCmSON, supra note 20, at 99-101, 103-04. One commentator has recently argued that the problem of state-created barriers to trade was in fact not a serious one. Kitch,
Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 11-19 (A. Tarlock ed. 1981). Even if Kitch is correct, however, restrictions on interstate commerce appear to have been perceived as a serious threat by leading
members of the Federal Convention. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 7, 11, 22 (A. Hamilton); J.
MADISON, supra note 73, at 46-48; 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
547-48 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as CoNvENION RECORDS].
7' The argument against economic protectionism has a general application:
By restraining, either by high duties, or by absolute prohibitions, the importation
of such goods from foreign countries as can be produced at home, the monopoly of the
home market is more or less secured to the domestic industry employed in producing
them ....
To give the monopoly of the home-market to the produce of domestic industry, in
any particular art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what
manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be either a
useless or a hurtful regulation....
... The industry of the country, [by such restraints on importation, is] turned
away from a more, to a less advantageous employment, and the exchangeable value of
its annual produce, instead of being increased, according to the intention of the lawgiver, must necessarily be diminished by every such regulation.
ADAm SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 420-24 (Mod. Lib. reprint 1937, E. Cannan ed. 1904)
(1st ed. London 1776); see also PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 672-85 (4th ed. 1958).
There may, of course, be special circumstances in which economic protectionism is a
sound policy. Alexander Hamilton, for example, argued forcefully that a temporary national
policy of insulating local industry from foreign competition was needed to promote a transition from an agricultural economy to a modem commercial system. A. HAMILTON, Report on
Manufactures, in THE REPORTS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 115 (J. Cooke ed. 1964). Hamilton
conceded, however, that even this might not be necessary if "the system of perfect liberty to
industry and commerce were the prevailing system of nations." Id. at 137-38; see also P.
SAMUELSON, supra, at 683-84.
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had sufficient incentives to remove these barriers and open its
markets unless the others did likewise.76 The Constitution was
meant in large part to provide a firmer foundation for commercial
expansion by erecting a central government with sufficient power
and breadth of views to control the narrow and ultimately selfdefeating jealousies of the several states.7
Perhaps the two greatest defects in the strength of the confederation government were its inability to regulate commerce and its
weak powers of taxation.78 These defects were cured in the new
Constitution." Wherever there is strength, however, there is a risk
that strength will be abused. The federal government could use its
extensive taxing and regulatory powers to do exactly the opposite
of what the framers hoped. If Congress became dominated by a
faction"0 of state delegations, it might use the federal power to set
up a new system of discriminatory barriers to trade. To the extent
that the federal government is stronger than the individual states,
this new system would be worse, for the dominated states, than the
anarchy that existed under the Articles of Confederation: these
states would be subject to discriminatory taxes and regulations but
would be unable to retaliate with protectionist legislation of their
own. 1 This would be but one obvious example of the natural oper71 James Madison pointed to the heart of the problem:
To those who do not view the question through the medium of passion or of interest,

the desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from
their uncommercial neighbors must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair;, since it
would stimulate the injured party by resentment as well as interest to resort to less
convenient channels for their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the
cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned, before public
bodies as well as individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and
immoderate gain.
THE FEDRLwsT No. 42, at 268 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
71 See THE FzRn
,mLis
No. 11, at 90 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("A unity of
commercial, as well as political, interests can only result from a unity of government."); id.
No. 23, at 153 (A. Hamilton) (proper regulation of commerce was one of the principal purposes for which the Union was created).
78 See J. MADISON, supra note 73, at 46-48.
79 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 1 (quoted supra text accompanying note 1); id. art. 1,

§ 8, cl. 3 ("[Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ....
),
80 "Faction" is defined by Madison as follows: "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community." THz FzDFstALis

No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison) (C.

Rossiter ed. 1961).
2 Discriminatory taxes and regulations (on the economic equivalence of which, see Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGwr. Sci. 22 (1971)) can have two distinct
undesirable effects. First, they always promote economic inefficiency and thereby reduce the
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ation of "the violence of faction."82
The Constitution attempts to reduce the general danger of
faction by promoting the election of competent and public-spirited
men to federal office8 and by hindering the concentration of power
in the hands of a few." In addition, however, the Constitution contains a number of specific restrictions on Congress's power to regulate commerce.8 5 The federal government may not give preferential

treatment to the ports of one state over another, 86 nor may it require shipping bound for any state to go through customs in another, 87 nor may it impose any taxes whatsoever on exports.8"
These specific constitutional provisions strengthen the general historical evidence indicating that the federal government's wide powers to regulate commerce exist primarily for the sake of removing
artificial and parochial obstacles to free trade.
Thus, while all these limitations on federal power can be interpreted as antifaction devices, and while majority factions are always most to be feared in a democratic regime,"9 the limitations
are designed to prevent factions from causing a specific substantive
evil: regional favoritism that reduces unrestrained economic competition.
This suggestion is further confirmed by the specific restrictions that the Constitution places on the powers of the state governments. 90 Apart from matters affecting foreign policy, most of
aggregate welfare of those affected by them; this was a major problem under the Articles of
Confederation, see supra note 75 and accompanying text. Second, when a central government discriminates in favor of one group within its jurisdiction and against another, this
effect is accompanied by a shift of economic advantage from one group to another, which
can make it worthwhile for groups to seek such discrimination despite the reduction in aggregate welfare that it causes. Thus, to the extent that the uniformity clause discourages
discriminatory taxation, it promotes both justice and economic efficiency.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (J.Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Madison listed as
one of the obstacles to the new Constitution the states' "natural jealousy" that power would
be abused in hands other than their own. 3 CONvNrION REcORDS, supra note 74, at 542.
See THE FEDFYALIST No. 10, at 82-83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
' See THE FEDERALiST Nos. 10, 47, 48, 51 (J.Madison).
" Justice Story, in the passage quoted by Ptasynski, see supra note 44, treats the uniformity clause itself as a check on faction. For further development of this point, see infra
notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 ("No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another .... ).
87Id. ("nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay
Duties in another").
"Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State.").
" See THE FEDERAST No. 10, at 77-78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
*0 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10; id. art. IV, § 2, cL 1. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10 provides:
No State shall... coin Money, emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
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these provisions forbid the states to interfere in the operation of a
national free-market economy. 1
2. The Supreme Court's Acknowledgement of the Free
Trade Norm. Although the Court has become extremely deferential towards Congress's exercise of its authority to regulate the
economy, 92 it continues to acknowledge that the Constitution exhibits an important, though implicit, preference for the free market. This can be seen most vividly in the "dormant commerce
power" doctrine. According to that doctrine, the commerce clause
precludes the states from many kinds of interference with interstate commerce, even where Congress has not preempted the
field.93 The constitutional text itself gives the Court no basis for
acting as Congress's surrogate in preventing the states from regu-

silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any... Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts ....
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports
or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws
shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage ....
Another important constitutional limitation on the states' powers, the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.
1, is discussed infra note 116. A related, inferred
constitutional limitation on the power of the states to interfere with free trade, the "dormant commerce power" doctrine, is discussed infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
91 The Constitution obviously does not enact any particular theory of laissez-faire capitalism, for the federal government is given wide discretion to affect the economy through
regulation and taxation. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(fourteenth amendment does not enact Herbert Spencer's Social Statics). But see McDonald, The Constitution and HamiltonianCapitalism,in How C rrAsnc Is THE CoNsuTIoN? 49 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1982) (arguing that while few of the framers
foresaw the full development of the modern capitalist economy, their political and economic
principles favored that development). But just as obviously, the Constitution is not characterized by simple economic agnosticism. Each of the restrictions on the power of government to interfere with commerce points towards a constitutional scheme in which free trade
and open markets are assumed to be a desirable norm.
" The Court did not always interpret the commerce clause as a virtually plenary grant
of authority. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional
Powers, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHi. L. REV. 887, 940-41 & n.380 (1982). For a demonstration that
the framers had a narrower view of the meaning of the clause, see Abel, The Commerce
Clause in the ConstitutionalConvention and in ContemporaryComment, 25 MNN. L. Rv.
432, 451-59, 465-81 (1941).
"The case law under the "dormant commerce power" doctrine has put very substantial constraints on the states' powers to impede interstate commerce. Generally, the states
are prohibited from any direct regulation of interstate commerce and from any incidental
regulation that is excessive in relation to the state's local interests. See Edgar v. Mite Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982). For reviews of the principal cases, see GERALD GUNTHRm, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONsTrruTioNAL LAW 257-342 (10th ed. 1980); Kitch, supra note 74, at 20-36.
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lating or affecting interstate commerce;9 4 the "dormant commerce
power" has therefore been inferred from a general preference for
free trade manifest in the purpose of the commerce clause. The
Court has proclaimed that by its interpretation of "silences" in the
Constitution, it has created a "federal free trade unit" in which
"every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by
any"; this task has been carried out with reference to the "vision of
the Founders."9 5

See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 578-79 (1847) (opinion of Taney, C.J.):
The language in which the grant of [the commerce] power to the general government is made certainly furnishes no warrant for a ... construction [denying the states
concurrent, though subordinate, power to regulate commerce], and there is no prohibition to the States. Neither can it be inferred by comparing the provision upon this
subject with those that relate to other powers granted by the constitution to the general government. On the contrary, in many instances, after the grant is made, the constitution proceeds to prohibit the exercise of the same power by the States in express
terms; in some cases absolutely, in others without the consent of Congress. And if it
was intended to forbid the States from making any regulations of commerce, it is difficult to account for the omission to prohibit it, when that prohibition has been so carefully and distinctly inserted in relation to other powers, where the action of the State
over the same subject was intended to be entirely excluded.
Another theory, which focuses not on the text of the Constitution but on the nature of the
power to regulate, would deny to the states all power to regulate interstate commerce. For a
comparison of this theory with Taney's, see Sholley, supra note 73, at 559-88.
"See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-39 (1949) (Jackson, J.):
The Commerce Clause is one of the most prolific sources of national power and an
equally prolific source of conflict with legislation of the state. While the Constitution
vests in Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states, it does not say
what the states may or may not do in the absence of congressional action, nor how to
draw the line between what is and what is not commerce among the states. Perhaps
even more than by interpretation of its written word, this Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given to these great silences
of the Constitution.
9

This principle that our economic unit is the Nation ... has as its corollary that
the states are not separable economic units .... This Court has not only recognized
this disability of the state to isolate its own economy as a basis for striking down parochial legislative policies designed to do so, but it has recognized the incapacity of the
state to protect its own inhabitants from competition as a reason for sustaining particular exercises of the commerce power of Congress to reach matters in which states were
so disabled. ...
The material success that has come to inhabitants of the states which make up this
federal free trade unit has been the most impressive in the history of commerce, but
the established interdependence of the states only emphasizes the necessity of protecting interstate movement of goods against local burdens and repressions....
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access
to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and
no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every
consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to
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The "dormant commerce power" doctrine, unlike the uniformity clause, is a limitation on the powers of the states, not of Congress. But it rests in part on the critical assumption that the commerce clause, though seemingly a plenary grant of authority to
Congress, was meant to be used to further the strong constitutional
preference in favor of free trade and open markets. When determining the scope of Congress's power under the commerce clause,
the Court has not required Congress to adhere to this purpose."
But what the Court has so clearly recognized in its "dormant commerce power" doctrine-that the Constitution is informed by a
general spirit favoring free trade and uninhibited competition-it
should also be willing to acknowledge when interpreting the uniformity clause. e This would be especially appropriate since the
uniformity and commerce clauses were originally connected in a
way that evinces a common purpose.98
3. The Origin and Purpose of the Uniformity Clause."9 The
uniformity clause was joined at the Federal Convention with what
is now the port preference clause;100 together, the two were
protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has
been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.
"See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of
wheat production where the wheat was grown for on-site consumption); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the exclusion from interstate commerce of goods
produced in plants where employees' wages and hours did not conform with federal
standards).
One might interpret the Court's dormant commerce power jurisprudence so as to
emphasize its antiparochial aspects; thus, the Court's doctrine might be thought to reflect a
general preference for centralized economic regulation. Justice Jackson's opinion in H.P.
Hood, however, indicates that parochial behavior by the states is disfavored not from a preference for centralized regulation, but rather for the sake of a national free-market economy.
See also Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 104 S. Ct. 3049, 3056 (1984) (discussing "our freetrade policy" under the commerce clause); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1876) (congressional inaction in the realm of interstate commerce "is equivalent to a declaration that
inter-State commerce shall be free and untrammelled").
It should also be noted that the Court has found free-trade policy to be relevant to first
amendment analysis. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (first amendment protects the free flow of
commercial information in our "predominantly free enterprise economy"); Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) ("[C]ommercial speech .. .performs an indispensable role in
the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system." (citation omitted)).
Evidence for the validity of the Court's free-trade policy is discussed supra notes 73-91
and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
"The history of the uniformity clause is thoroughly reviewed in Knowlton, 178 U.S. at
95-106, upon which the present discussion relies. Since that opinion was written, nothing
new has been discovered that would require alteration of the Knowlton summary. The
Knowlton discussion is summarized very briefly in Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at 2243 & n.10.
2" U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 ("No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of
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designed as a limitation on the powers granted to Congress in the
commerce and taxing clauses.1 01 For reasons that are now unknown, the two provisions were separated by the Committee on
Style and assigned to the places that they now occupy.10 2 The port
preference clause limits both the commerce and taxing powers,
while the uniformity clause applies to the taxing power alone.
Their common origin, however, is a sign of their common purpose:
each is meant to prevent geographic discrimination by Congress
that would give one state or region a competitive advantage in its
commercial relations with the others. 0 ' This is shown by the remarks accompanying the original introduction of the provisions 0 '

Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels
bound to, or from, one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.").
101 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 103-04. The text of the joint version was as follows:
"Nor shall any regulation of commerce or revenue give preference to the ports of
one State over those of another or oblige Vessels bound to or from any State to enter,
clear, or pay duties in another.
And all tonnage, duties, imposts, and excises, laid by the Legislature shall be uniform throughout the United States."
2 CONVElrON REcORDS, supra note 74, at 434 (quoting the report of an ad hoc committee).
101 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 105.
1o0 The Knowlton Court went so far as to state in dictum that the two clauses have an
identical meaning. Id. at 104. The Court did not, however, base its conclusion on any port
preference clause cases, and indeed the wording of the port preference clause, as well as its
place in the constitutional scheme, provides the basis for clear distinctions between it and
the uniformity clause.
First, the port preference clause forbids only discrimination along state lines, while the
uniformity clause contains no such limitation. The Ptasynski Court, perhaps misled by
Knowlton, unfortunately ignored this difference in language between the two clauses and
implied repeatedly that the uniformity clause, too, may forbid only discrimination along
state lines. See Ptasynski, 103 S.Ct. at 2241 & n.5, 2242, 2246.
The port preference clause is also different from the uniformity clause in that it applies
not only to taxation but also to regulation under the commerce clause. The Supreme Court
has read the port preference clause narrowly, perhaps in part because of its expansive reading of the commerce power. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 284
U.S. 125, 131 (1931) ("Congress, acting under the commerce clause, causes many things to
be done that greatly benefit particular ports and which incidentally result to the disadvantage of other ports in the same or neighboring States."); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 435 (1855) ("[W]hat is forbidden is, not discrimination between individual ports within the same or different States, but discrimination
between States .... ).
Although the general purposes of the uniformity clause and the port preference clause
are the same, the differences between them are significant. Probably because of these differences, the Court has not relied on port preference clause decisions when deciding uniformity
clause cases.
'o See Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 103:
"Mr. Carroll and Mr. L. Martin expressed their apprehensions ...that, under the
power of regulating trade, the general legislature might favor the ports of particular
States, by requiring vessels destined to or from other States to enter and clear thereat

.... They moved the following proposition:
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and by the fact that much of the discussion leading up to the Convention was concerned with ensuring that the related measures of
taxation and commercial regulation would be made uniform.1 "
Thus, the history of the uniformity clause strengthens the case for
interpreting it as part of the constitutional scheme for promoting
an economy based on open markets and free competition.
This suggests the following formulation of its purpose: the uniformity clause is meant to inhibit the use of the taxing power to
give any region a competitive advantage over other regions that it
would not enjoy in the absence of the tax. This formulation is compatible with the notion of preventing ruinous discrimination, which
was probably the danger most vividly present in the imaginations
of the framers.10 6 It goes beyond that notion, however, because the
language of the clause demands ito? and because the framers intended the Constitution to do more than save the country from
disaster. They wished, as the Court has acknowledged, to ensure
that "every consumer may look to the free competition from every
producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by
8
any.o10
B. A New Supplement to the Head Money Rule
The Head Money rule is consistent with the purpose of the
uniformity clause, but it needs to be supplemented with a rule that
distinguishes permissible from impermissible "subjects" of taxation. This section of the comment proposes such a rule, explains its
application, and demonstrates its superiority to the rules adopted
"'The legislature of the United States shall not oblige vessels belonging to citizens
thereof, or to foreigners, to enter or pay duties or imposts in any other State than in
that to which they may be bound, or to clear out in any other than the State in which
their cargoes may be laden on board; nor shall any privilege or immunity be granted to
any vessel on entering or clearing out, or paying duties or imposts in one State in
preference to another."'
On the same day Mr. McHenry and General Pinckney submitted a proposition
... relating to the establishment of new ports in the States for the collection of duties
or imposts, which concluded as follows:
"All duties, imposts and excises, prohibitions or restraints, laid or made by the
legislature of the United States, shall be uniform and equal throughout the United
States."
(quoting 5 J. ELLioT, DBATzs ON THE ADOPnON OF THE FDzAL CONsTmTmON 478, 479
(Washington 1845)) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
I See Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 101-03; see also 1 G. BANCROPT, supra note 73, at 249-51;
sources cited supra note 73.
I0 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
1" H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
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in Ptasynski.
1. A Proposed Method of Analyzing Challenged Statutes.
The Head Money, Knowlton, and Ptasynski Courts all supplemented the Head Money rule by examining the challenged statute
in light of the purpose of the uniformity clause. 109 The defects of
the Head Money rule make this approach necessary. But the Court
has never explained precisely what characteristics of a statute
should cause it to be invalidated. 1 0
Since the principal purpose of the uniformity clause is to discourage Congress from engaging in commercial discrimination
against one region of the country in favor of another,"' a test must
be devised that will further this purpose. Inquiries into legislative
motives, however, are notoriously difficult and embarrassing exer1
cises for the courts to conduct. "2
Yet, it would simply be impracticable to require that taxes be framed so that all discriminatory effects are avoided."" This dilemma is inherent in the nature of the
uniformity clause. The difficulties can best be avoided by a test
that tolerates discriminatory (i.e., nonuniform) effects, but only so
long as there is good reason to suppose that they are not driven by
discriminatory intent. The perils of subjective speculation about
legislative motives can be minimized by requiring that some legitimate purpose in the design of the tax be shown. This inquiry
would entail a reasonably objective analysis of the terms of a statute and its legislative history."
The new test can be formulated as follows: if the definition of
the subject of a tax is tailored to serve some significant purpose

"0

See Head Money, 112 U.S. at 595; Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 86-106; Ptasynski, 103 S.

Ct. at 2243-44.

110 See supra note 12; supra text following note 28; supra text following note 64.
"'
See supra text following note 105.
122 See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); United States v.

O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-84 (1968); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810).

The Court, however, frequently finds itself compelled to engage in such inquiries despite the
well-recognized hazards of doing so. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-48
(1976); cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (requiring inquiries into legisla-

tive purpose).
Ptasynski's analysis of legislative motives, see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying
text, is less sensitive to the hazards of the undertaking than is the analysis proposed in this
comment.
118 For example, Congress must be supposed free to tax tobacco without also taxing
corn, even though this would somewhat damage the competitive position of one regional
economy in relation to another. See supra text following note 5. Even if corn growers and
tobacco growers do not compete for the same consumer dollar, they compete to some extent
for capital and labor. For further discussion, see infra note 115.
114

For a further elaboration of this point, see infra notes 116-32 and accompanying
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other than to promote the competitive advantage of goods or services produced in one region over those of another region, the tax
should be upheld despite any incidental geographically discriminatory effects that may result from the definition.115 This kind of
test, which allows legislation to have discriminatory effects provided that some other important and legitimate purpose is also
being served, is a familiar one in other areas of constitutional
jurisprudence." 8
"lA more elegant rule would simply forbid nonuniform taxes on any goods or services
that are functionally equivalent in the sense that they compete against each other in the
market. If goods and activities could be divided according to this simple criterion, one would
have a clean and satisfying solution to the problem that has so bedeviled the Court's uniformity clause jurisprudence. Moreover, it would avoid the necessity of the Court's engaging
in the difficult and unpleasant task of examining congressional purposes and motives.
Unfortunately, standard economic theory holds that all goods are part of an interconnected system, so that any increase in the price of one good will cause consumers to begin
substituting others in its place. GEORGE J. STmGL, THE THEORY OF PRIcE 31-33 (3d ed.
1966). This "substitution effect," or "cross-elasticity of demand," pervades commercial life,
and no way has been devised to divide goods into categories across whose lines the substitution effect can reliably be presumed to be insignificant. Id. at 33; F. ScHxas, INDusTRIAL
MARKEr STRUTURE AN ECONOsC PERFORMANCE 59-64 (2d ed. 1980).
Rough approximations of such categories have been found useful in certain areas of
antitrust law. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323-28 (1962);
United States v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393-96 (1956). In antitrust
law, however, the Court is faced with the need to find tools with which to enforce a vague
statutory mandate; Congress may be presumed to have deferred to the Court's judgment in
adopting the tools that it has. But to use such unreliable tools to invalidateacts of Congress
would be a far more questionable undertaking.
I'l The closest analogy is in the jurisprudence of the privileges and immunities clause,
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. This constitutional provision, like the uniformity clause,
serves the same general purpose as the commerce clause. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S.
518, 531-33 (1978). The privileges and immunities, uniformity, and commerce clauses are all
meant to reduce commercial preferences among the states and regions, though the Court has
recognized the impossibility of simply eliminating all discrimination. The constitutional test
under the privileges and immunities clause is set forth in Toomer v. Witsell:
Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is
not an absolute. It does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there
is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it. Thus the inquiry in
each case must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them.
334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (citation omitted), cited with approval in Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 52526.
A similar test has been employed in first-amendment jurisprudence. See United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (restrictions on free expression are valid if narrowly
tailored to serve a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression). Even racially discriminatory legislation, against which the Court has found the
deepest constitutional prejudice, is permitted when racially discriminatory effects are an
incident of otherwise legitimate programs. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976) ("[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise

1220

The University of Chicago Law Review

[51:1193

2. Applying the New Test. In order to apply this new rule,
the sorts of goals Congress may legitimately pursue in defining the
"subjects" of indirect taxes must be determined. Generally, they
would include any that are not forbidden by the uniformity clause
or by some other constitutional provision. Certainly, the traditional purposes that have underlain these taxes must be presumed
legitimate.
In the case of customs duties, the most important purpose (besides raising revenue 11 7 ) is almost always to procure a commercial
advantage for the constituents of the jurisdiction erecting the barrier. Congress, which was given the power to impose these duties 1 8
largely to help the nation compete effectively in the world market,11 9 apparently has never been tempted to apply a tax with so
obvious a discriminatory purpose against any American state or region. 12 0 Internal indirect taxes (herein referred to generically as
"excises"), however, are typically used to penalize the consumption
of some article or service in order to promote the general welfare.
So-called "sin taxes," such as those on tobacco and liquor, are conspicuous examples of excises designed to promote the health and
perhaps the morals of the populace. "Luxury taxes" on such items
as jewelry are probably also designed, at least in part, as an expression of moral sentiments. 2 1 As traditional practice suggests, and as
The Federalist confirms, such "subjects" of taxation should be
permitted under the uniformity clause despite incidental geo1 22
graphically discriminatory effects.

within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.").
"T Obviously, procuring revenue is a valid purpose. But so general a purpose as raising
revenue would rarely dictate the precise way in which the subject of an indirect tax was
defined. If in some case it did, the tax should be upheld.
118 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
1.
11 See THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 85-86 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
120 One uniformity clause case involved customs duties. In Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244, 249 (1901), the Court indicated that duties on merchandise imported from Puerto Rico
would certainly have been invalid under the uniformity clause if Puerto Rico had been part
of the United States. Cf. Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at 2244 n.12 (discussing Downes).
1 According to public finance theory, "sin taxes" may be economically efficient where
demand for the subject of taxation is relatively inelastic (i.e., where consumption remains
fairly constant even when the price to the consumer rises because of the tax). Taxing a good
with this characteristic may be an effective way of raising revenue without distorting consumption decisions. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 448-49 (1980). This insight, however, does not change the analysis that permits
taxing such goods in an attempt to reduce consumption, especially since it is unlikely that
demand for any of the subjects of the sin taxes is perfectly inelastic. See id.
121 The Court in Head Money took traditional practice to be decisive. See supra note
11. The Federalistrecommended a duty on imported liquor, partly in order to discourage its
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To illustrate, suppose that Congress enacts a liquor tax that
applies to distilled spirits and exempts beer and wine. This would
cause consumers to engage in some substitution of beer and wine
for distilled liquors, which in turn would discriminate against the
prime whiskey-producing areas of Kentucky and Tennessee in
favor of regions where wineries and breweries are more important.
If Congress had grounds for believing that hard liquor is more
prone to abuse or more damaging to health, the tax should be upheld. But if Congress were attempting to eliminate a natural competitive advantage in one region-for example, the presence of
cheap labor in the whiskey-producing regions-the tax should be
123
invalidated.
Similarly, "benign" geographic discrimination, i.e., "fashion[ing] legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems,' ' 4
should be prohibited if its purpose is to alter the relative competitive positions of two regions: discrimination against one region
12 5
does not become legitimate simply because it also helps another.
Thus, for example, the uniformity clause should be read to proscribe a tax levied on Maryland tobacco at a time when most of the
tobacco-growing region, save that state, was suffering from a yield126
reducing blight.

consumption, which was considered injurious to the morals and health of the society. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 95-96 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
12 For a discussion of the proper allocation of the burden of proof when Congress's
true aims are difficult to discern, or where both permissible and impermissible aims exist,
see infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
M Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at 2245 (quoting Rail Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 159).
125The Supreme Court, in applying the "dormant commerce power" doctrine, has recognized that there is no meaningful distinction between "benign" and "malevolent"
discrimination.
Virtually every discriminatory statute allocates benefits or burdens unequally; each can
be viewed as conferring a benefit on one party and a detTiment on the other, in either
an absolute or relative sense. The determination of constitutionality does not depend
upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened party. A discrimination
claim, by its nature, requires a comparison of the two classifications, and it could always be said that there was no intent to impose a burden on one party, but rather the
intent was to confer a benefit on the other. Consequently, it is irrelevant to the Commerce Clause inquiry that the motivation of the legislature was the desire to aid the
makers of the locally produced beverage rather than to harm out-of-state producers.
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 104 S. Ct. 3049, 3057 (1984).
'" See supra text accompanying note 12. This application of the uniformity clause
would leave Congress with sufficient powers to address itself to "geographically isolated
problems." For example, a federal program to combat the tobacco blight directly, or to lend
financial assistance to those affected by the blight, could be established under the spending
power. These devices would have several advantages over discriminatory taxation. First, because they would be financed by money taken from the general revenues, the burden would
not fall arbitrarily on those who happened to be competitors of the afflicted tobacco farm-
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3. The Practicabilityof the New Test. The approach developed in this comment has one disadvantage compared with that
adopted in Ptasynski. Because almost all indirect taxes have geographically discriminatory effects,12 there is a danger of administrative inconvenience in subjecting every new statute imposing
such a tax to judicial review. This problem is avoided by Ptasynski's per se rule of validity for taxes in which the "subject" is defined without geographic terminology.
This advantage in the Ptasynski approach, however, is not
great enough to justify sapping the uniformity clause of all oforce.
Indeed, the administrative inconvenience of the approach advocated by this comment should not be overestimated. Since the new
test distinguishes clearly between the factors that Congress may
and may not consider in framing the "subject" of a tax, the doctrine proposed here should not require a protracted series of cases
to establish with tolerable certainty the boundaries of the proposed
categories.12 8 Furthermore, since indirect taxes are but a minor element of the modern federal taxation arsenal, there is little reason
to anticipate a flood of litigation in response to whatever ambiguities may be present in the proposed approach. 12 9
Nevertheless, it would be proper to establish different levels of
scrutiny depending on whether the "subject" of the tax is defined
in expressly geographic terms or not.13 0 Where Congress has
avoided geographic terminology in defining the "subject" of a tax,

ers. Furthermore, because such alternative programs would be more directly addressed to
the underlying problem, they would be likely to be more precisely tailored to that problem.
For the same reason, such programs would be less likely than a discriminatory tax to outlive
the problem that Congress was seeking to solve. For further discussion of this point, see
infra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
12 See supra text following note 5; supra note 11 and accompanying text.
128 The Court's privileges and immunities clause jurisprudence, in which one finds a
test very similar to the one proposed in this comment, see supra note 116, has not produced
any unmanageable theoretical problems. See G. GuNTHRr,
supra note 93, at 374-79.
9 In 1965, most federal excise taxes were eliminated. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX PoLicy 185 (4th ed. 1983). These taxes now account for less than 6% of the federal revenue, id.
at 2, and over half of this 6% is attributable to the crude oil windfall profit tax, id. at 186.
Thus, the situation here compares favorably with that in related areas of constitutional law.
Under the "dormant commerce power" doctrine, for example, where the Court has used
categories similar to, but more complicated than, those proposed in this comment, see, e.g.,
L. Tams, AMmuCAN CONsTrrurioNAL LAW §§ 6-1 to 6-13 (1978), innumerable health and
welfare laws in each of the fifty states are at least theoretically subject to judicial review.
ISO The Ptasynski Court essentially adopted two levels of scrutiny in its approach to
the uniformity clause: none at all where the statute defines the "subject" of the tax in
nongeographic terms, see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text, and highly deferential
review where Congress has employed geographic terms, see supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
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it should be presumed that it had a legitimate purpose in mind;
the burden should be on the challenger to show that no significant
nondiscriminatory purpose is served by the tax. Where, however,
Congress chooses to define the "subject" of a tax in geographic
terms, the burden should be on the government to show that a
legitimate purpose was in fact intended. 1 An approach that allocates the burden of proof according to the language of the statute
preserves Ptasynski's virtue-discouraging frivolous antitax litigation-without also preserving its excessively narrow reading of the
uniformity clause.132
4. A Reconsideration of the Ptasynski Decision. Ptasynski's
per se rule of validity for taxes in which the "subject" is defined in
nongeographic terms is dictum and therefore not binding on future
Courts.13 3 The rule on which the holding of the case rests--"actual
geographic discrimination" is forbidden in taxes framed in geographic terms'- 4-is vague enough that future Courts could read it
to permit the interpretation of the uniformity clause developed in
this comment.13 5 In order to provide a further illustration of the
proper application of the uniformity clause, however, it will be use"S One may assume that, where the "subject" of the tax is phrased in geographic terms,
it is more likely than not that Congress had in mind the economic welfare of a particular
region, rather than a specific problem to be resolved on a nationwide basis.
13 This approach is analogous to the familiar technique of applying especially intense
judicial scrutiny to facially discriminatory laws. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (gender-based discrimination); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971)
(discrimination on the basis of alienage); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (racial discrimination).
Cases might arise in which Congress had both permissible and impermissible aims. In
such circumstances, the Court should require that the legislation be reasonably tailored to
its permissible ends. Cf. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) ("[T]he inquiry in each
case must be concerned with whether [valid independent] reasons [for disparate treatment]
do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them."); supra
note 116. Note, however, that the degree of discrimination should not by itself affect the
question of a statute's validity. Cf. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981) (under
the commerce clause, "[w]e need not know how unequal the Tax is before concluding that it
unconstitutionally discriminates.").
It might be argued that the allocation of the burden of proof proposed in this comment
would make it impracticable, even if not theoretically impossible, for a tax that used exclusively nongeographic terms to be successfully challenged: the rule could be underprotective
because of the difficulty of detecting cases in which a facially neutral law is indeed motivated by regional favoritism. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. If this were true,
Ptasynski's per se rule of validity for such taxes, see supra notes 30, 45-47, 60-64 and accompanying text, would in effect be retained. Even if the Court's application of the proposed rule led to this result, however, there are other reasons, discussed infra notes 148-54,
for adopting the approach advocated in this comment.
133 See supra note 30.
Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at 2245; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
"
See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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ful to show why the Ptasynski Court might have found that the
Windfall Profit Tax Act's provision for "exempt Alaskan oil" violated the Constitution.
Oil from the exempt region competes directly with oil from
other regions, and the exemption thus improves the competitive
position of one region over that of others. The principal problem,
therefore, is to decide whether the challenged provision in the statute had any reasonable purpose other than geographic discrimination. So far as one can tell from the Ptasynski opinion, the legislative history,3 8 and the briefs filed in the Supreme Court,13 7 the
Alaskan exemption must be given one of the following three interpretations.
First, the tax as a whole may have been the instrument by
which an oppressive faction of non-oil-producing states sought to

redistribute wealth from the few states where oil is a significant
industry. The Alaskan exemption, it was suggested to the Court,
could have resulted from the need that this faction had for the
help of a powerful Alaskan Senator.""8 The Court's opinion does
not discuss this possibility, but such a log-rolling rationale clearly
would not justify the nonuniformity of the tax, even under Ptasynski's highly deferential approach to congressional motives.13 9
Second, the exemption may have been an instance of "benign"
discrimination, in which Congress was attempting to ameliorate
136

H.R. REP. No. 304, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws 587; S. REP. No. 394, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NFws 410; H.R. REP. No. 817, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 642.
137 Brief for the United States of America, Appellant; Brief of Taxpayer Appellees;
Brief of Association Appellees; Brief for The State of Texas, Appellee; Brief for The State of
Louisiana, Appellee; Brief of Amici Curiae, The Legal Foundation of America, et al.; Brief of
Amicus Curiae, The Standard Oil Company; Brief of Amici Curiae, Gulf & Great Plains
Legal Foundation of America, et al.; Brief of Amici Curiae, Senator Don Nickles, et al; Brief
of Amici Curiae, American Farm Bureau Federation, et al.; Brief of Amicus Curiae, Atlantic
Richfield Company;, Brief of Amicus Curiae, United States Representative Silvio 0. Conte;
Brief of Amicus Curiae, The State of Alaska, Reply Brief for the United States of America,
Appellant.
138 Briefs filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of the tax's challengers alleged that
the Alaskan exemption was included in the Act in order to induce a powerful Alaskan Senator to join a congressional faction composed primarily of representatives from states where
little or no oil is produced. Brief of Association Appellees at 10-12; Brief of Amici Curiae,
The Legal Foundation of America, et al. at 11-13 & n.13. For further discussion of this
point, see Norton, The Limitless Federal Taxing Power, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'y
(forthcoming).
139 If the challengers' allegations, see supra note 138, were true, the windfall Profit Tax
Act as a whole would be an oppressive device of exactly the sort that the framers were most
worried about. See supranotes 43-44 and accompanying text; supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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the special difficulties that impede oil production in northern
Alaska. At several points, Ptasynski seems to rest its analysis on

this assumption. 14 0 But, as was demonstrated above,141 deliberate

geographic discrimination should not be considered permissible
under the uniformity clause simply because it helps one region in
addition to hurting others.
Finally, the Alaskan exemption might be considered justifiable
on the ground that oil from northern Alaska is uniquely expensive
to produce. If there were evidence to show that Congress was acting on this supposition, the exemption would be defensible as an
attempt to increase the country's aggregate production of ol-a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory aim, especially in light of the national-security implications of dependence on foreign sources of oil.
This would be a plausible interpretation of the Court's reading of
1 42
the facts in Ptasynski,
and such an interpretation would permit

the Court to apply the test suggested in this comment, while leav140The decision in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974),
cited repeatedly in Ptasynski, is relevant primarily for the following proposition: "'[tihe
uniformity provision [of the bankruptcy clause] does not deny Congress power to take into
account differences that exist between different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems."' Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at 2245 (quoting
Rail Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 159). Accordingly, the Court stressed that "unique climactic [sic]
and geographic conditions" in the exempt region provided the exemption with a rational
basis. Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at 2242.
141 See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text; supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
141 The Court assumed that Congress "gave more favorable treatment to those classes
[of oil] that would be responsive to increased [after tax] prices" and that exempt Alaskan oil
was a "unique class" by virtue of the "disproportionate costs" of developing it. Ptasynski,
103 S. Ct. at 2245-46; see also id. at 2242 n.7.
This supposition, however, is not correct. While the cost of producing oil in Alaska is
very high, mainly because of the area's harsh climate and remoteness from the principal oil
markets, there is no reason to suppose that other areas of the country are not laboring
under other handicaps that would cause their costs per-barrel-produced to be as great or
greater than Alaska's. For example, if a region has oil occurring in small pools spread rather
far from one another, the cost of drilling dry wells in search of oil might make the final cost
per-barrel-extracted extremely high. Similarly, as the Court was told, the costs associated
with certain kinds of specialized wells in other areas of the country are very high. Brief of
Amici Curiae, The Legal Foundation of America, et al. at 8. Obviously, direct evidence of
production costs in the most economically unfavorable areas of the country does not existincentives have not been provided for exploration and production in those areas. Cf. supra
note 58 (discussing factors that affect the cost of oil production).
If Congress were simply attempting to encourage exploration and production in economically unfavorable areas, it could have considered drafting an exemption that did so
directly. But Congress could not have had a reasonable basis for imagining that northern
Alaska is the only such area in the nation. Unless a rationale can be found for the Alaskan
exemption that is compatible with the purpose of the uniformity clause, see supra notes 99108 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court must have erred in declaring that exemption constitutional.
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ing the actual decision, though not the reasoning, in Ptasynski
intact.
C. The Importance of the Uniformity Clause
This comment has shown that the uniformity clause is best
understood as a limit on Congress's power to promote the commercial success of any region of the country at the expense of others. It
may be argued, however, that the Supreme Court has given Congress such wide discretion under other clauses of the Constitution
that any limitations imposed by the uniformity clause would be
practically insignificant.
It is true that current Supreme Court interpretations of the
spending power 143 and of the commerce clause244 would allow Congress to carry out, by other means, many geographically discriminatory programs forbidden by the uniformity clause. For example,
Congress is permitted to raise revenue through nondiscriminatory
tax mechanisms and then redistribute the money so that one region benefits at the expense of others.1 45 Similarly, Congress may
provide for regulations of commerce that confer disproportionate
benefits on one region or another. 46 In such cases, Congress can
'43 The textual basis for the spending power is U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power... to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States .... ."). Because of the procedural obstacles to taxpayers' suits, cases directly construing the clause are rare. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 101-03 (1968) (standing to sue requires a "logical nexus" between the challenger's status
as a taxpayer and the substantive claim on which he seeks adjudication). But what authority
there is suggests that Congress may spend money in any way that it sees fit, so long as it
does not violate some other specific constitutional provision. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 90-91 (1976) (general welfare clause puts no limitation on congressional discretion); see
also Flast, 392 U.S. at 105-06 (article I jurisdiction exists for taxpayers' suits only when
the challenged law is alleged to be "in derogation of those constitutional provisions which
operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power"); Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586-87 (1937) (use of federal money for payments to unemployed persons is comprehended in "promotion of the general welfare"). But cf. THE FFDERALIST No.
41, at 262 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961):
It has been urged and echoed that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,
and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare
of the United States," amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power
which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No
stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.
144 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The breadth of congressional discretion under the
Court's reading of this clause is well known. See generally G. GuNTHER, supra note 93, at
153-211.
145 The "spending"
may take the form of simple cash transfers or of capital
improvements.
216 For example, the price controls for which the windfall profit tax was a replacement
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achieve indirectly exactly the sort of regional favoritism that the
uniformity clause should prevent it from accomplishing by means
147
of nonuniform taxation.
Nevertheless, a sound jurisprudence of the uniformity clause
would be likely to prevent some congressional abuses. Nonuniform
taxation is a relatively blunt and indirect instrument for enhancing
or undermining the competitive position of one or another region
of the country. A spending or regulatory program would require
Congress to address itself more directly and forthrightly to the
goals being pursued. This would have two advantages.
First, because spending and regulatory schemes tend to display more clearly than discriminatory taxes what is being done and
who is paying for it, they provide fewer opportunities for a faction
in Congress to conceal its self-serving purposes. This in turn
reduces the likelihood that a discriminatory scheme would succeed.
Two situations can be distinguished. In one, a minority faction
might be prevented from deceiving other members of Congress

included special provisions for oil produced in northern Alaska. See Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. at
2240 & n.1. No uniformity requirement restricts congressional power under the commerce
clause. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981).
147 This anomaly could be eliminated if the spending power and the commerce clause
were interpreted in light of the constitutional purposes emphasized in this comment. See
supra notes 73-98 and accompanying text. This could be justified on the grounds that the
uniformity clause is closely linked with the text on which the spending power is based, see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and also closely linked in its origins with the commerce clause,
see supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. One would argue that Congress's spending
and commerce powers should be confined within the same kinds of limits as the taxing
power, and for the same reasons. Such an attempt to recover the original meaning of those
clauses would, however, require a thorough reformation of current constitutional doctrine-a task that is beyond the scope of this comment.
Another approach to limiting congressional discretion under the spending and commerce powers would begin with the willingness of the Court to proscribe the exercise of
those powers when some other specific constitutional provision is thereby violated. See, e.g.,
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980) (spending power is limited by due process
clause of the fifth amendment); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840-52
(1976) (tenth amendment limits the commerce power); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6,
29-53 (1969) (commerce power is limited by the due process clause of the fifth amendment);
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-83 (1968) (commerce power is limited by the
sixth amendment trial-by-jury clause); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (dictum) (fifth amendment due process clause limits the spending power). The fifth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, prohibits the federal government from taking private property
for public use without just compensation. Were the just-compensation requirement applied
literally, many geographically discriminatory spending and regulatory schemes could be held
invalid under the fifth amendment. (Such an argument is developed in Epstein, supra note
41.) Here again, however, the solution would depart dramatically from the Supreme Court's
current practice, see, e.g., the discussion supra note 41, and would require a more detailed
elaboration than is possible in this comment.
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whose acquiescence is needed for the bill to pass." 8 In the other, a
majority faction would be exposed to a greater risk of embarrass149
ment in the court of public opinion.

Second, the opportunities for congressional inadvertence
would be diminished. 150 This is clearest in the case of "benign geographic discrimination," where Congress is seeking to aid a region
that suffers from some special handicap. If Congress spends money
from the general revenues to ameliorate the problem, the resulting
burden will be spread widely through the population because the
vast bulk of the general revenue is derived from the income tax. A
geographically discriminatory excise or excise exemption, however,
places the burden on the relatively narrow category of persons subject to that excise. T5 When Congress honestly believes that regionspecific aid is a way of providing for the general welfare, it should
also want the costs of providing that aid to be borne generally.' 52
Discriminatory excises can conceal the true victims of the discrimination and thus increase the likelihood that they will be victimized
inadvertently. 153 Similarly, spending and regulatory programs
aimed at correcting region-specific handicaps are more likely than
discriminatory taxes to be narrowly tailored to the problems Con148Members of Congress, like all human beings, have limited time and energy. Any rule
that increases their access to information about the effects of their votes reduces their vulnerability to manipulation by their colleagues or by special-interest groups.
" Public opinion would probably be a greater obstacle to majority factions today than
in earlier periods of our history, since regional loyalties have diminished. This same factor,
of course, reduces the chance that majority factions would be organized along geographic
lines in the first place. Nevertheless, special interests in one region may still have the opportunity and motive to capture a majority faction in Congress and promote discriminatory
schemes; some of these schemes might be rejected if the captured legislators' constituents
were alerted to them.
160 As this comment has shown, the uniformity clause goes beyond the desire to prevent
the effects of self-serving factions in Congress. It also embodies the constitutional preference
for a free and open national economy in which goods and services from all regions compete
on an equal footing. See supra notes 71-108 and accompanying text. Accordingly, inadvertently discriminatory taxes, unless they serve a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose, see
supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text, are no less invalid under the clause than those
that are the product of factional self-interest.
1I
In place of the challenged exemption to the windfall profit tax, for example, Congress could have provided a direct cash subsidy to the producers of each barrel of oil from
northern Alaska. Since this subsidy would be paid out of the general revenues, Congress
would have been forced to ask itself whether it really believed that there was some general
national interest in promoting oil production in this particular region.
11, This is strongly suggested by Congress's heavy reliance on the geographically uniform income tax as a source of revenue. See J. PEcHmAN, supra note 129, at 2 (income and
payroll taxes accounted for over 90% of federal revenue in 1982).
153 The immediate victims of discriminatory excises are those who happen to be competitors of the favored class. It is easy to forget this fact when one's attention is focused on
those who want or seem to need special tax breaks.
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gress is seeking to solve.15 '
Suppose, finally, that Congress could and would use its spending and regulatory powers to evade all the restraints that the uniformity clause is meant to place on its discretion. Even this possibility would not justify the Supreme Court in disregarding the true
meaning of the uniformity clause and refusing to enforce it.1 55 If
"[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is, '15 6 the possibility of congressional
evasions can neither extinguish that judicial duty nor obligate the
Court to facilitate congressional evasions of the law.
CONCLUSION

The uniformity clause is an important constitutional check on
the taxing power of the federal government. The Supreme Court
has struggled-unsuccessfully-to develop a jurisprudence with
which that check can be enforced. The chief reason for the Court's
lack of success has been its failure to appreciate the role of the
uniformity clause in the Constitution's strategy for promoting a
free-market economy.
The Court's most recent opinion is a confession of either despair or indifference. On the basis of an inadequate analysis, it guts
the uniformity clause and invents an empty and unexplained constitutional test. At the next opportunity, the Court should modify
its present approach along the lines suggested in this comment.
The uniformity clause would thereby be restored to its proper
place in the American system of limited government.
Nelson Lund

14

For example, one might imagine a government-sponsored program to develop more

efficient means of producing oil in harsh climates or a change in the restrictive environmen-

tal regulations that apply in northern Alaska. Such solutions to the problem of high development costs in Alaska would directly address the causes of those high costs. Unlike the
Alaskan exemption from the windfall profit tax, they would also encourage Congress to confront the costs of solving the problem; for that reason they would be easier to evaluate on
their merits.

I" It would be anomalous to argue that, because the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the commerce clause and the spending power-themselves positive grants of power
to Congress-the Court is now justified in narrowly interpreting the uniformity clause-a
limitation on a third grant of power. Although the commerce power was originally intended
to be used for a narrower purpose that comported with that served by the uniformity clause,
see supra note 92 and accompanying text, there is no textual limitation on Congress's commerce and spending powers so broadly phrased as that which the uniformity clause places
on the taxing power.

I" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).

